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and an appreciation of the special problems involved in conglomerate
mergers should be considered by the courts. In the majority of con-
glomerate merger situations and in most mergers within imperfectly
competitive markets prediction of probable results is guesswork at
best. Consideration of post-merger effects, when such evidence is
available, would reduce speculation by presenting to the courts actual
results instead of projected theory. Giving weight to the post-acquisi-
tion evidence in such cases, moreover, in the long run might tend to
increase economic diversification, encourage competition in many
cases, and greatly simplify the problems faced by the courts in apply-
ing section 7.
Teddy M. Jones, Jr.
The Doctrine of Negligent Entrustment in Texas
I. BACKGROUND
Negligent entrustment is a general doctrine by which a vehicle
owner may be held liable for the subsequent negligence of one to
whom he entrusts his vehicle. In Texas, the doctrine of negligent en-
trustment has been applied in two main areas: (1) entrustment of a
vehicle by the owner to an unlicensed,' incompetent,' or reckless'
driver, and (2) entrustment by the owner of defective vehicles.4 This
discussion is limited to cases involving the doctrine as it has been
applied in the first area, i.e., entrustment of a vehicle to an unlicensed,
incompetent, or reckless driver.
In Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co.,' the Supreme Court of
Texas stated the elements that one must prove in order to establish
the owner's liability under the doctrine of negligent entrustment:
(1) entrustment by the owner, (2) negligence in entrustment to
(a) an incompetent or reckless driver which was (b) known or should
have been known by the owner, (3) liability of the driver which
(4) proximately resulted from the entrustment.
'Spratling v. Butler, 150 Tex. 369, 240 S.W.2d 1016 (1951); Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter
Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314, 206 S.W.2d 587 (1947); Seinsheimer v. Burkhart, 122 S.W.2d
1063 (Tex. Comm. App. 1939), noted, 17 TEXAS L. REv. 506 (1939); Mayer v. Johnson,
148 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
2 Russell Constr. Co. v. Ponder, 143 Tex. 412, 186 S.W.2d 233 (1945); Mclntire v.
Sellers, 311 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error Tef. n.r.e.
'Murray v. Pasotex Pipe Line Co., 161 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1947).
4 Russell Constr. Co. v. Ponder, 143 Tex. 412, 186 S.W.2d 233 ,1945); Goff v. Lubbock
Bldg. Products, 267 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error rel. n.r.e.; Texas Co. v. Veloz,
162 S.W. 377 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
'146 Tex. 314, 206 S.W.2d 587, 591 (1947).
[Vol. 20
II. ANALYSIS OF ELEMENTS OF NEGLIGENT ENTRUSTMENT
A. Entrustment By Owner
It is necessary to show that the driver of the vehicle obtaind pos-
session with permission of its owner or from someone with authority
to grant such permission; i.e., if the owner customarily lent his
vehicle to the driver, but if the driver took the vehicle and drove it
away without the owner's express permission on that particular jour-
ney there is no entrustment, and the owner is not liable for subse-
quent negligence by the driver.' However, if all other elements
are proved, the fact that at the time of the collision the driver had
deviated from the scope of the bailment, agency, or designated route
is no defense to the owner's liability.!
B. Negligence In Entrustment To (1) Incompetent
Or Reckless Driver Which Was (2) Known Or Should
Have Been Known By The Owner
In finding the requisite negligence on which to predicate the
owner's liability in the "no driver's license" cases, Texas courts, in
line with the weight of authority, hold that the violation of a statute'
making it unlawful for a person knowingly to permit an unauthor-
ized individual to drive a motor vehicle is negligence per se.' The basis
for finding such a violation to be negligence per se is that the statute"
was designed to secure a minimum of competence and skill for drivers
of automobiles and to fix a standard of conduct for persons lending
their automobiles to others." Furthermore, its principal aim is to
afford some protection to the interests of other persons on or near
public highways." Some jurisdictions, however, hold that the viola-
tion of such a statute is mere evidence of negligence, 3 or is prima
facie proof of negligence.'
'Worsham-Buick Co. v. Isaacs, 87 S.W.2d 252, 126 Tex. 546 (Tex. Comm. App. 1935);
Vaughn v. Watkins, 344 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.; Hanson v.
Green, 339 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref.; Long Floral and Nursery Co. v.
Sherman, 245 S.W. 467 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
'Spratling v. Butler, 150 Tex. 369, 240 S.W.2d 1016 (1951); Frontier Theatre v.
Whisenant, 291 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
8
TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b-22 (1960).
9Carter v. Montgomery, 226 Ark. 989, 992, 296 S.W.2d 442, 444 (1956); Smith v.
Thomas, 126 Ind. App. 59, 130 N.E.2d 85 (1955); Thomasson v. Winsett, 310 S.W.2d
33 (Mo. Civ. App. 1958); Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314, 206 S.W.2d
587 (1947); PROSSER, TORTS § 34 (2d ed. 1955).
'°TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6687b-22 (1960).
"1 Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314, 319, 206 S.W.2d 587, 589 (1947).
12 Ibid.
"See, e.g., Le Blanc v. Pierce Motor Co., 307 Mass. 535, 30 N.E.2d 684 (1940).
"4See, e.g., Owens v. Carmichael's U-Drive Autos, 116 Cal. App. 348, 2 P.2d 580
(1931), See also Annot., 69 A.L.R. 2d 978, 983 (1960).
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Perhaps the greatest difficulty encountered in proving negligent
entrustment arises when there is no per se negligence arising from
violation of a statute. These cases require proof of the driver's gen-
eral incompetency and of the owner's (defendant's) knowledge
thereof at the time of the entrustment. A number of evidentiary
requirements must be met establishing the substantive issues of
incompetence and knowledge.
The DWI cases1" illustrate the most definitely established rules as
to admissibility of evidence in proving general incompetence from
repeated (habitual) intoxication. In the recent Fifth Circuit decision
of Cheeney Co. v. Gates,16 the trial court had allowed the plaintiff to
introduce pretrial interrogatories to which defendant had answered
that prior to the present action he had been charged with and had
pled guilty to a DWI violation. The court of appeals held the testi-
mony inadmissable, saying: "In proving a Texas-based theory of
driver incompetence arising out of a history of repeated incidents
of driving while intoxicated, Texas holds that past convictions . . .
(or of charges to which a defendant pleads guilty) . . . even of fel-
ony charges, of driving while intoxicated are not admissable."' 7
Relying on a contemporaneous decision of the Texas Supreme Court
in Compton v. Jay, 8 the court held that where the basis of a negli-
gent entrustment action is general incompetence arising from repeated
driving while intoxicated, this issue must be proved by general repu-
tation evidence, not by proof of isolated instances. 9 Though not a
negligent entrustment case, Compton was concerned with admissi-
bility of evidence of prior convictions for DWI for the purpose of
impeaching the credibility of the defendant or for corroborating
other evidence which tended to show that the defendant was intoxi-
cated at the time of the accident. The Compton case was an action
against the driver for personal injury arising out of an automobile
accident. The court in the Cheeney case held that the underlying
theory of the Compton decision is substantially the equivalent of a
negligent entrustment claim. The court went on to say that if prior
DWI convictions cannot be used for the purpose of impeachment,
certainly the prior DWI charge in the Cheeney case could not be
admitted to prove the substantive issue of negligent entrustment.
Thus, only general reputation evidence can be admitted in estab-
lishing incompetency in the DWI cases.
" The phrase, "DWI cases," as used in this context, does not refer to DWI prosecutions,
but to negligent entrustment actions in which liability is based on the driver's intoxication.
'e 346 F.2d 197 (sth Cir. 1965).
'
T Id. at 206.
"s389 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. 1965).
" Cheeney Co. v. Gates, 346 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1965).
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NOTES
In Cheeney, while disallowing specific prior DWI convictions to
prove driver incompetency, the court said by way of dicta that "for
other types of driver incompetence, specific prior instances would cer-
tainly be proper.""
The general rule in Texas has been that evidence of a driver's pre-
vious accidents or instances of negligence is inadmissible in a civil
action arising out of a motor vehicle accident, because such evidence
is immaterial in the determination of the driver's negligence on the
occasion in question. 1 Further, the analysis of two eminent Texas
writers is that "character for care or negligence (competency), when
such characater is in issue has always been regarded as provable by
reputation."2 Thus, it would appear that for other types of incom-
petency the general rule for admissibility of evidence of such incom-
petency would be the same as the ruling in the DWI situations. The
Cheeney dicta, however, expressly contradicts this rule. The court
cited several Texas cases that have recognized the admissibility of
prior automobile accidents or specific instances of recklessness or
carelessness, as tending to show, the driver's underlying general com-
petency as distinguished from negligence at the time of the accident
in question." However, the cases admitting specific prior instances of
accidents, traffic offenses, and convictions have been those in which
either gross negligence was alleged" by the plaintiff or where all the
evidence and testimony was concerned with the driver's competency."
In establishing that the entrustor knew or should have known
of the driver's incompetence, the courts have generally adhered to
the "reasonable man" standard, i.e., if a reasonable man by exercise
of due care could have ascertained that the driver was generally
incompetent to drive, then such owner is negligent in entrusting the
2
°Id. at 207.
25 "Generally, similar facts and transactions are inadmissible, even if of an identical na-
ture to prove a specific fact." Houston Elec. Co. v. McElroy, 153 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1941). See also Cameron v. Downing, 147 S.W.2d 963 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941);
Davidson v. Swanson, 24 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); Baker v. Schoeder, 198 S.W.
394 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
'2McCoRMICK AND RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EvIDENCE §§ 1502, 1506 (2d ed. 1956).
"Union Transports, Inc. v. Braum, 318 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958); McIntire
v. Sellers, 311 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Allen v. Bland, 168
S.W. 35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) error ref. n.r.e.
" The gross negligence allegation is directed to the driver's negligence, not to the en-
trustor's negligence, i.e., when the driver is guilty of several or numerous acts of negligence
while within the entrustment. Thus, if plaintiff's pleadings are sufficient to present the issue
of gross negligence, then evidence of prior traffic violations of the driver is admissible on
the issue of gross negligence itself on the theory that the driver was a reckless, careless and
incompetent driver. Union Transports, Inc. v. Braum, 318 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958).
2 Cases "where all the evidence and testimony is concerned with the driver's competency"
arise when the entrustor entrusts his vehicle to one whose appearance or conduct is such as
to indicate his incompetency or inability to operate the vehicle with due care. Here, specific
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vehicle.' It follows that if specific prior acts are allowed in proving
the driver's general incompetence in the enumerated non-DWI
cases, prior acts may also be admitted into evidence to determine
whether the entrustor (defendant) knew or should have known of
such acts at the time of the entrustment.
C. Liability Of Driver
The necessity of showing that the driver was liable is a prerequisite
to liability of an entrustor who allowed the unauthorized or incom-
petent person to operate a vehicle." This is such a fundamental
requirement in establishing negligent entrustment that attorneys may
overlook its significance. It matters little whether the driver has a
license, whether he is intoxicated at the time of the accident, or
whether he is notorious for recklessness if at the time of the accident
it is not proved that the driver's negligence was the proximate cause.
It should be remembered, however, that in the "no driver's license"
cases, the establishment of proximate cause is aided by the fact that
negligence of the driver is established as a matter of law, for in Texas,
violation of a criminal statute is negligence per se."
D. Entrustment Must Be The Proximate Cause Of
Plaintiff's Damages
Though a negligent act of the driver is the cause of damages,
there must be proof that the act proximately resulted from the own-
er's entrustment of the vehicle. To constitute the entrustment a prox-
imate cause, the defendant entrustor should be shown to be reason-
ably able to anticipate that an injury would result as a natural and
probable consequence of the entrustment." It must be observed,
however, that where there is a violation of the statute prohibiting
unauthorized persons to drive, and where it is further shown that the
negligence of the operator caused the damage to the plaintiff, the
necessary causal connection is shown between the negligence of the
owner in lending the automobile and the damage to the plaintiff."0
Thus, the Texas rule that the owner is negligent per se for violating
instances of carelessness or recklessness are admissible in proving both the driver's incom-
petency and the entrustor's knowledge thereof. McIntire v. Sellers, 311 S.W.2d 886, 895
(Tex. Civ. App. 1958) (concurring opinion) error ref. n.r.e.
26Mundy v. Pirie-Slaughter Motor Co., 146 Tex. 314, 206 S.W.2d 587, 591 (1947).2 7 id. at 591.2
1id. at 590.
2Frontier Theatre v. Whisenant, 291 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
'0 Railway Express Agency v. Knebel, 226 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949), following
the reasoning of the Mundy case, i.e., it is negligence per se to entrust a car to a driver
with knowledge that he does not have a license, knowledge being determined by the "reason-
able man" standard.
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the statute prohibiting unauthorized persons to drive aids consider-
ably in establishing proximate causation.
It should be noted that contributory negligence of the plaintiff
is a defense to a cause of action based on negligent entrustment.
1
Also, the stipulation that the doctrine of respondeat superior applies
is an effective bar to any evidence of the driver's prior recklessness or
negligence, for in respondeat superior cases all that is needed to hold
defendant (employer) liable is proof that the driver (employee) was
acting within the scope of his employment. Proof of the competency
of the driver is immaterial and inadmissible. 2
III. Conclusion
Though the Mundy decision clearly delineates the elements of neg-
ligent entrustment in Texas, one can readily perceive the practical
difficulties encountered and the thoroughness required in establishing
those elements. The apparently conflicting rules concerning admissi-
bility of evidence of past specific instances of negligence or incompe-
tence is a striking example of the interrelationship of the elements.
If the courts follow the Cheeney dicta to the effect that past specific
acts of the driver are admissible to prove incompetence in non-DWI
cases, such evidence might easily prejudice the jury on the issue of
the driver's specific negligence at the time of the accident. It seems
peculiar indeed to allow past specific instances of negligence to be
used to hold the entrustor liable, when such evidence supposedly
could not be admitted had the suit been merely to establish the negli-
gence of the driver."
Can we assume that admission into evidence of prior specific
instances of negligence is meant to be peculiar to the establishment of
negligent entrustment in non-DWI cases? The Cheeney decision does
not specifically so limit its application. In fact, the Cheeney dicta
conflicts with the long established and fundamental policy of law-
that prior specific instances of negligence or prior convictions of a
particular offense have no relevancy to the offense or occurrence
under consideration. If the courts are attempting to limit the admissi-
bility of such evidence to negligent entrustment cases a clearly defined
policy should be formulated. Reference to the provisions of article
" Hardage v. Rouly, 349 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961) error ref. n.r.e.
"Patterson v. East Texas Motor Freight Lines, 349 S.W.2d 634 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961)
error ref. n.r.e.
33 See note 22 supra.
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